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Abstract 
 
Thinking is one of the most interesting mental 
processes. Its complexity is sometimes simplified 
and its different manifestations are classified into 
normal and abnormal, like the delusional and 
disorganized thought or the creative one. The 
boundaries between these facets of thinking are 
fuzzy causing difficulties in medical, academic, and 
philosophical discussions. Considering the 
dopaminergic signal-to-noise neuronal modulation 
in the central nervous system, and the existence of 
semantic maps in human brain, a self-organizing 
neural network model was developed to unify the 
different thought processes into a single 
neurocomputational substrate. Simulations were 
performed varying the dopaminergic modulation 
and observing the different patterns that emerged at 
the semantic map. Assuming that the thought 
process is the total pattern elicited at the output 
layer of the neural network, the model shows how 
the normal and abnormal thinking are generated 
and that there are no borders between their 
different manifestations. Actually, a continuum of 
different qualitative reasoning, ranging from 
delusion to disorganization of thought, and passing 
through the normal and the creative thinking, seems 
to be more plausible. The model is far from 
explaining the complexities of human thinking but, 
at least, it seems to be a good metaphorical and 
unifying view of the many facets of this phenomenon 
usually studied in separated settings. 
 
I. Creativity 
 
One of the most interesting and fuzzy of 
our mental activities is what we call creativity. 
Since Classical Antiquity, the act of creating new 
ideas, original artistic expressions, and unforeseen 
machinery has fascinated the  philosopher and the 
layman. The mystery  of creation seems to come 
from the fact that the new emerges from the 
nowhere of old, well-known, and current 
concepts. 
 Many have tried to define and partially 
explain the creative phenomenon. It could be, for 
Gagné, the combination of ideas from different and 
largely separated knowledge fields [1], or, second 
Rogers, the ability of making unusual relationships 
or unexpected connection between elements [2]. 
Associationists say that creative people are capable 
of linking external stimuli to highly unlikely 
answers, generating solutions masked for the 
majority [3]. Cognitivists explain creativity as 
another way of information processing or cognitive 
style [3].  
Focusing attention on the central elements 
of a problem and disregarding the peripheral ones is 
a good strategy for finding a conventional and 
unique solution to a problem. This convergent-
thought approach is naturally taught at schools and 
societies and used for the majority of the people in 
everyday life situations. However, broadening the 
attention to a wider range of elements and regarding 
them as potentially relevant may be a better 
approach to find out new and creative solutions. 
This divergent thought style follows many 
directions at the same time and allows the discovery 
of unusual associations of ideas. 
For the Gestalt School, creativity is the 
reorganization of mental structures, producing new 
associations of ideas depending on the perception of 
the real situation [4]. The more flexible the mental 
reorganization, the more creative the thinking 
process. 
Also, psychodynamical theories were 
proposed to explain creativity. Freud suggested that 
the creative act is a consequence of a fantastic view 
of the world when the real world frustrates 
someones desires. If the incursion to fantasy does 
not alleviate the frustration, neurosis arises [3]. In 
the model of Adaptative Regression [5], the creative 
process is viewed as a regression to unconscious 
levels which allows a momentarily freedom from 
stereotyped and conventional scenes. Psychosis is 
seen as a involuntary and uncontrolled regression to 
childlike modes of thinking, while the creative 
person is capable of a temporary and controlled 
regressive trip. 
Although inconclusive [6, 7, 8, 2, 9], 
psychodynamical theories gather in a single model 
creativity, psychopathology and unconsciousness. 
Indeed, many reports express a strong correlation 
between creative and psychotic thinking. In the 
seventies, creative writers and maniacs were 
compared and a common tendency to broaden or 
shift conceptual boundaries (overinclusion) was 
observed [10]. The overinclusiveness of the maniacs 
was based on bizarre associations while that of the 
writers was due to the recognition of original and 
valuable associations. In another study, 
schizophrenics and creative adults were tested and a 
common wider attentional focus was noted along 
with a capacity of making looser associations [11].  
In the eighties, creativity and 
schizophrenic  thought were suggested to be the 
same cognitive process based on the Alternate Uses 
Tests [12]. Recently, almost three hundred famous 
biographies were rated by the DSM III and 
creativity was again linked to pathological 
personality characteristics or  disorders, mainly 
bipolar disorder [13]. Another study concluded that 
coarse rather than focused semantic activation is 
strongly related to schizophrenic thought and 
creative thinking [14]. Whatever the relation 
between psychopatology and creativity is,  some 
commonalties seem to exist, like the idea of 
broader, distant or looser association making and 
unfocusing of attention.  In the present paper, these 
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commonalties will be explored to define an unifying 
model for creative and disturbed thought. 
 
II. Delusions 
Delusions are thought processes that deviate from 
the normal logical thinking by  their character of 
subjective certainty, incorrigibility, and 
impossibility of content, as originally pointed out 
Karl Jasper [15]. Delusion is a primary phenomenon 
that express itself through judgments, and so, it is 
not the judgment indeed. That is why delusions 
cannot be understood and corrected even in the 
presence of many logical arguments.  Indeed, as 
some delusions are possibly true, the impossibility 
of the content of a delusion was later changed to 
falsity. However, in some cases, like religious 
questions, true or falsity are not applicable [16]. 
Impossible, improbable, or even true, a delusion is a 
statement made in an inappropriate context or 
without a logical justification. Normal thought has 
reasons to justify itself and can embed the 
possibilities of doubt. Delusions are not followed by 
adequate and reasonable justifications and their 
property of  total and unquestionable certainty leads 
to their incorrigibility. 
Delusional manifestations are of three 
types: Delusional perception, representation and 
cognition. In the process of delusional perception, 
the patient attaches an abnormal meaning to a 
sensation or perception of the world. Usually, the 
real world perception is taken as a signal or 
revelation to the patient. In the delusional 
representation, a memory trace returns to 
consciousness with a new meaning while in the 
delusional cognition there are no perception or 
memory traces to attach new interpretations, but just 
an intuition that suddenly appears.      
For Freud, delusion is a defence process 
where  judgment mistakes are made when the ego 
tries to isolate from consciousness intolerable 
representations. When an intolerable idea is 
inseparably connected to reality, the only way of  
isolating it from  consciousness  is detaching from 
reality [17]. For the Gestalt School, some 
neurophysiological process breaks the coherence 
between perception and thinking, leading to the 
emergence of new gestalts [17].  Following the 
ideas of Hebb about cell assemblies [18], Fish [19] 
developed  a neurobiological theory where the 
overstimulation of  the cell assemblies that represent 
ideas of a sequential thought would lead to the 
process of delusion. In his theory, the reticular 
formation was the central responsible for the 
referred overstimulation., and the neurotransmitter 
serotonine was the neurochemical basis for the 
delusional thinking. Another important theory that 
relates delusions to the neurotransmitter dompamine 
will be reviewed in the next section. 
Delusions begin from a mixture of 
anxiety, hiperarousal, suspicion, and the attachment 
of meaning to insignificant events. Once a meaning 
is attached, the patient will not question the event 
anymore and will further elaborate on it. This 
delusional work is an attempt to find coherence in 
his unusual thoughts. Acute delusions respond to 
neuroleptic treatment while chronic delusions tend 
to be resistant. Chronic delusions are not a state 
where the person is but part of the individual values, 
intentions, and views. It seems  that the chronically 
deluded patient has a structural deformation that 
may have developed from the dynamical forces 
present in the acute delusion [20]. Chronic delusions 
may also develop from a state of  sensorial 
deprivation like, for example, isolated individuals 
(prisoners, refugees, hearing loss).  
 
III. Dopaminergic Modulation 
The catecholamines norepinephrine, epinephrine, 
and dopamine are important neuroactive substances 
produced in some brain sites and released at distant 
and widespread areas in a diffuse or divergent way 
[21]. These substances do not act through 
membrane ion channels but, instead, activate 
intracellular messengers, promoting a longer effect 
than the other neurochemicals released by synapses 
inside the brain. As these other chemicals have 
specific and local synaptic patterns, act through ion 
channels, and have short-lasting effects, it is 
interesting to suppose that they differ from the 
cathecolamines in function. Indeed, the substances 
released by synapses in the CNS may be classified 
in the two broad categories of neurotransmitters and 
neuromodulators [22]. Due to the fast action and 
connection patterns of their producing synapses, 
neurotransmitters seem to be involved in the 
immediate processing of signals, while the 
neuromodulators, with their opposing properties, 
hint for a regulatory function, modulating the 
operational  characteristics of the receptor neurons, 
i.e. their responses to neurotransmitters [23].  
 Increases or decreases in the 
catecholaminergic levels have behavioral 
consequences in arousal, attention, learning, 
memory, and motor responses [24]. It is not clear, 
but it seems plausible to suppose that 
catecholamines affect the neuronal ability to discern 
what is information from what is noise in a signal. 
Some authors suggest that these neuromodulators 
enhance the stronger signal and dampen the weak 
one [20], while others advocate that they enhance 
the cell sensitivity to either excitatory and inhibitory 
signals [22]. Whatever the mechanism is, the net 
effect is the enhancement of the signal in relation to 
the background, spontaneous activity called noise. 
The signal-to- noise ratio at neuronal level has been 
associated with the performance in some cognitive 
tasks and behaviors, including the deviant behavior 
of  psychosis. 
 The dopamine hypothesis of 
schizophrenia advocates that the disorder is caused 
by an overactivity of the brain dopaminergic system 
[20]. Observations that dopamine antagonists 
alleviate schizophrenic acute symptoms support the 
hypothesis [25]. An elaboration of  this hypothesis 
is that the dopamine release is chronically reduced 
in schizophrenic patients, leading to the 
upregulation of the postsynaptic receptors and a 
consequent intensified response in moments of 
normal or increased dopamine release, for example, 
due to environmental stressors [26]. This would 
explain both, the positive and the negative, 
symptoms of the disease.  
 A relation between acute delusions and 
dopamine activity is clear from the fact that 
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amphetamine can cause psychotic states with 
paranóia, hyperarousal, hyperactivity, and 
suspiciousness. It also seems that a decreased 
dopamine level leads to a higher signal-to-noise 
ratio and  looser associations of  thought, allowing 
the creation of new relations [20]. For example, 
overinclusion and  semantic priming are two 
phenomena observed in schizophrenic patients that 
can be related to lower dopamine levels and to 
abnormally looser thought associations [24]. 
  
IV. Cortical Maps 
In the middle of the 19th century the scientists 
Helmholtz and Mach studied many phenomena of 
the visual perception in humans. Particularly, they 
were interested in optical illusions like the fact that 
edges or contours between light and dark parts of an 
image tended to be enhanced in relation to the light 
and dark interior of  the image. They explained the 
illusion hypothesizing that in the human retina the 
cells are excited by light that converges to a central 
region and are inhibited by the light that projects to 
the surrounding areas. Almost a century later, 
experimental results showed that the eye of the crab 
called Limulus [27] and some vertebrates [28] have 
an structure, then called on-center/off-surround, in 
which a neuron is in cooperation, through excitatory 
synapses, with the neurons in the immediate 
neighborhood while it is in competition with the 
neurons which lay outside these surroundings. 
There is experimental evidence supporting that the 
same mechanism is also present in the mammalian 
central and peripheral nervous system. It seems that 
pyramidal cortical cells are connected in this on-
center/off-surround way [29]. Other areas in the 
brain, like the hippocampus and the cerebellum 
show the referred hardwired structure [30, 31].  
 Competition and cooperation are found 
not only statically hardwired but also as part of 
many neuronal dynamical processes. As a matter of  
fact, competition is essential to the 
neurodevelopment where neurons compete for 
certain chemicals. In synaptogenesis, for example, 
the substances generically called neural growth 
factors  are released by stimulated neurons and, 
spreading through diffusion, reach the neighboring 
cells, promoting synaptic growth. Cells that receive 
neural growth factors make synapses and live, while 
the cells that have no contact with these substances 
die [32]. A neuron that releases neural growth factor 
guides the process of synaptic formation in its 
tridimensional neighborhood, becoming a center of 
synaptic convergence. When some neighboring 
neurons release different neural growth factors in 
different amounts, many synaptic convergence 
centers are generated and a competition is 
established between them by the synapses of their 
surroundings. It seems that at least two processes 
participate in the dynamics of synaptic formation:  
pre-synaptic neurons competing for neural growth 
factors to survive and pos-synaptic neurons that 
release neural growth factors competing for 
synapses that will keep them alive with stimuli. It is 
worth noting that, as a single neuron is capable of 
receiving and releasing neural growth factors at the 
same time, the two competition processes described 
above effectively occur in every neuron and, 
consequently, a signaling network is established to 
control the development and plasticity of neural 
circuits. Remembering that all this competition is 
started and controlled by environmental stimulation, 
it is possible to have a glimpse to the way the 
environment records or represents itself in the brain. 
 The competition processes described 
above are essential to the formation of some 
neuronal organizations called maps. A neural map is 
a biological circuit composed of two sets of 
neurons, called domain and image, in such a way 
that similar patterns of activation of the domain are 
projected to neighboring neurons in the image. In 
other words, a neural map is a projection that 
transfers similarities at the domain to spatial 
relationships at the image.  Maps were first 
observed in 1937 [33] and later the concept was 
refined [34] taking the somatosensory and  motor 
cortices  as  models. Studies of the visual [35], 
somatosensory [36], and associative [37] cortices 
showed that small regions of those tissues respond 
to similar stimuli. Indeed, stimuli like position, 
orientation, color, spatial frequency, auditory 
frequency, and also meanings [38, 39, 40, 20] are 
capable of being represented in neuronal circuits as 
maps.  
These maps are subject to constant 
change, not only in the neurodevelopmental phase, 
but throughout life as a function of ones 
experiences [41]. Monkeys trained to discriminate 
between two different vibrations imposed to the 
finger skin showed an increase in the region of the 
somotosensory cortex responsible for the finger 
representation [42]. Marked cortical changes were 
also demonstrated in blind subjects when comparing 
the braille reading finger cortical representation to 
the other fingers representations [43]. 
Maps have puzzled neuroscientists in the 
last decades, mainly the question of how do they 
arise from the simple on-center/off-surround wiring 
pattern. Computational theories gave some 
important insights to the problem, since some 
cortical maps are artificially developed from simple 
governing rules of  synaptic plasticity in computer 
simulation models. The most general of these 
models is called the Self-Organizing Map [44] in 
which two sheets of neuronal tissue with n neurons 
each, corresponding to the domain and the image, 
are initially randomly connected in a way that every 
neuron i at the image receives synaptic projections 
w i ∈ Rn  from every neuron at the domain (Figure 
I). Neurons at the domain dont form synapses 
among themselves and receive sensory inputs 
(stimuli), while neurons at the image make synapses 
following the on-center/off-surrounding paradigm, 
i.e., short-range excitation or cooperation and long-
range inhibition or competition.   
The on-center/off-surround synapses 
dont change during the development of the map, 
while the synapses between the domain and the 
image are modified along the process of map 
formation. Indeed, every time the neural network is 
in contact with a stimulus xk ∈ Rn, k=1,2,... in its 
domain, there will be only one excited neuron i* at 
the image because the short-range cooperation and 
long-range competition makes the more excited 
neuron inhibit the others.  The position r* of this 
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winner neuron at the image determines how much 
the synapses will be modified. Synapses from 
neurons closer to the winner  will be strongly 
changed in such a way that these neurons will be 
more intensely excited by the stimulus xk in a next 
time. Synapses from neurons distant from the 
winner will be weakly changed or not changed at 
all, depending on the dispersion σ  of the 
neighborhood function φ(ri r*), where ri ∈ Rn gives 
the position of a neuron i at the image sheet. By this 
process, every neuron in the image will be more 
easily excited by the stimulus xk (synaptic 
facilitation) in the future. The development of the 
map is due to the fact that the amount  of synaptic 
facilitation is proportional to the distance from the 
winner neuron. The process of synaptic 
modification ∆wil for each neuron i is repeated for 
every  learning step l  where the stimulus xk ∈ Rn, 
k=1,2,...  is presented to the neural network, and is 
given by 
      ∆wil = ρ(l) .φ(ri, r*). (xk - wi),                       (1) 
where  ρ(l) is the learning rate defined by 
     ρ(l) = ρ0 .β (l-1); 0 < β < 1,  l=1,2,             (2) 
 The learning rate begins with the value ρ0 
and decreases with the learning step l with a rate β. 
 The neighborhood symmetric function 
φ(ri, r*)  takes the form of a gaussian function  like  
     φ(ri, r*)   = exp -( || ri - r*||2 / 2 σ(l)2 ).          (3)    
 The initial dispersion of the gaussian, σ0, 
is high, representing that all the neurons in the 
image are considered neighbors. This allows the 
modification of the randomness of the initial 
synapses to a more organized pattern where 
neighborhood is of capital importance. Every time 
step l that another stimulus is presented to the neural 
network domain, the neighborhood shrinks a bit, 
gradually giving to the map a local organization. 
The dispersion σ(l) at each learning step is given by  
      σ(l) = σ0 .α (l-1); 0 < α < 1, l=1,2,              (4)  
where α  is a decrement rate. 
 The way the learning rate decreases and 
the neighborhood shrinks is fundamental to the map 
development. A faster decrement in the learning rate 
does not give enough time to the synapses to 
change, and so the randomness of the initial 
synaptic pattern is consolidated at the end of the 
process. When neighborhoods shrink rapidly, the 
level of neuronal cooperation necessary to produce 
maps are not present and neighborhood 
relationships are ill-defined at the end of the 
simulation. Indeed, the neighborhood function may 
be likened to the steady-state concentration profile 
of a neural growth factor in the neural tissue. When 
the dynamical equilibrium between neural growth 
factor release and metabolization is accomplished in 
every region of the tissue, due to the diffusion 
process, a concentration profile that asymptotically 
decreases with radial distance is attained (see Figure 
III). The parameter σ0 represents the amount of 
neural growth factor released by the neurons at the 
beginning of the neurodevelopment process.  
 As plasticity is always happening in our 
brains, if the parameter  σ , that controls the rate of 
synaptic alteration, is kept constant, the map will 
represent a cortex which is capable of  changes 
during ones entire lifetime. 
 
V. Simulation Results 
A self-organizing neural network with its two bi-
dimensional sheets composed of 400 neurons each 
was developed for computer simulation, as shown in 
Figure I. A set of different stimuli, symbolized by 
the geometrical markers and representing different 
concepts or ideas, was repeatedly presented to the 
Domain sheet of the neural network. Due to the 
existence of feedforward connections between the 
Domain and the Image sheet, every stimulus 
presented to the Domain is projected to the Image. 
Initially, as the synapses are randomly generated, 
the stimuli presented to the Domain sheet are 
projected to random positions at the Image layer. As 
long as the stimuli are repeatedly presented to the 
neural network, the synapses change and a map-like 
structure develops at the Image layer. Similar 
stimuli, representing nearly associated or similar 
concepts, when presented to the Domain layer, lead 
to the excitation of neighboring regions in the Image 
neuronal layer. The contrary also holds as different 
stimuli, representing dissimilar or not directly 
associated concepts or ideas, when presented to the 
self-organizing neural network will excite neurons 
at distant regions at the Image sheet. This is what 
we call a semantic map. 
 The purpose of our simulations is to show 
that different maps arise when dopaminergic 
modulation controls the synaptic formation process. 
In fact, varying the parameters responsible for the 
signal-to-noise ratio results in maps that represent 
the concepts or ideas in a way that can be likened to 
the delusional, creative, and disorganized thought. 
To simulate the signal enhancement promoted by 
the dopaminergic activity, a threshold θ is 
associated to every neuron at the Image sheet [22]. 
When the total signal input, coming from the 
Domain layer to an Image sheet neuron, exceeds the 
threshold, this neuron is considered to be excited. 
Increasing or decreasing the threshold will promote 
the effect of dopaminergic enhancement or 
dampening of the incoming signal. The simulation 
of noise is simply obtained by adding to the 
stimulus a random number with a range between p 
and +p where p is a percentage of the stimulus 
value [22]. The parameters  θ and p allow us to 
realize any simulation desirable with total control 
flexibility  over the signal-to-noise ratio. 
 In a first simulation experiment, a 
semantic map was allowed to develop from the self-
organizing neural network when ten stimuli, 
representing ten different concepts or ideas, were 
repeatedly presented  to the Domain layer with no 
noise and a predefined signal level θ of  0.999. This 
map is represented in Figure I and will stand as a 
reference for future comparisons. Note that the 
similar stimuli * and  ✳ were mapped into 
neighboring regions of the Image neuronal layer 
while, for example, the very different stimuli 
represented by / and + were mapped into the 
opposing corners of the Image sheet. This 
observation was done just to show that the map was 
well-formed for these ten concepts or ideas. Now, in 
a second simulation, the Domain sheet of this 
already well-formed map will be excited by the 
single stimuli represented with an *. The 
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dopaminergic modulation was changed in this 
simulation with the addition of a noise level p of 10 
%. The resulting Image layer map can be seen in 
Figure II. Note that with the addition of noise, the 
stimulus * expanded its representation, exciting 
neurons outside its original region at the Image 
layer and invading the region represented by the 
concept represented by ✳. This can be interpreted as 
if the increase of noise level, or equivalently the 
decrement of the signal-to-noise ratio, was capable 
of promoting the association of the different, but 
similar, ideas or concepts * and ✳, neighbors in the 
map. Much of our reasoning can be understood as 
an association of ideas. Indeed, when a stimulus 
(endogenous or exogenous) elicits a central idea, 
that we will call here a thesis, other ideas, that 
corroborate or refute the thesis, are spontaneously 
elicited. Let us call these spontaneously elicited 
ideas of  antitheses.  As the thesis and the 
antitheses are elicited at the same time, they are 
temporally associated, and the final result of this 
simultaneous presence is the weighted sum of their 
influences, emerging a final pattern that we will call 
here the synthesis or  the conclusion of the 
reasoning process. If we assume that the normal 
thought is the triggering of a thesis that elicits a 
group of antitheses which will be weighted 
(pondered) together to generate a synthesis, then, for 
the occurrence of  the  normal  thought, it is 
necessary some level of noise or a relatively lower 
dopaminergic modulation of the signal-to-noise 
ratio.  
In the next simulation, the noise level will 
be increased from 10  % to 170 % and the same 
procedure realized in the second experiment 
repeated. The result is shown in Figure III. Note that 
now the central stimulus * (thesis) has excited many  
neurons  outside its original representation, invading 
areas where others stimuli were represented. In our 
model, this means that a central idea (thesis) has 
been associated with many other ideas (antitheses) 
generating a pattern that we can liken to the creative 
thinking. If, in the normal thought, a central idea 
(thesis) is associated to a few neighboring and 
similar ideas (antithesis), in the creative thinking, 
this same central idea, will be associated to 
different, normally not associated, ideas. The 
process of making associations between a central 
stimulus and distant ones resembles the formerly 
reviewed theories of creativity where concepts like 
loosening of associations,  divergent-thought,   
the ability of making unusual relationships, 
flexibility of  mental organization, a 
momentarily freedom from stereotyped and 
conventional scenes, the broadening of the 
conceptual boundaries, the unfocusing of 
attention, and some other similar concepts are 
always present.  As a consequence, to the 
occurrence of creative thinking, it is necessary a 
higher level of noise, or equivalently, a lower 
dopaminergic modulation of the signal-to-noise 
ratio, as experimentally observed [24]. 
The same way that coarse rather than 
focused semantic activation is strongly related to 
schizophrenic thought and creative thinking [14], 
the model presented here can show the subtle border 
between creativity and disorganized thought. 
Indeed, if the signal-to-noise dopaminergic 
modulation is still more reduced as the consequence 
of an increase in the noise level  p from  170 % to 
200 %, and the same simulation experiment 
repeated, a new pattern will appear in the Image 
layer of the neural network, as can be seen in Figure 
IV. Note that this increase in noise was sufficient to 
make the same stimulus * invade other distant areas 
that it had not invaded in the anterior simulations. 
This means that the central idea (thesis) elicits a 
plethora of other ideas (antitheses) resulting in a 
new pattern that represents a synthesis  where all the 
ideas are present and associated between 
themselves. It is not possible in this case to know 
what is the central idea and what is laterally 
associated. The synthesis lacks a coherence in 
relation to the thesis because all the associated ideas 
are equally present and weighted, and opposing and 
corroborating ideas have the same influence over 
the conclusion (synthesis).  The synthesis 
encompasses any idea independently of its contents 
or proximity in relation to the thesis. We can say 
that a synthesis like this represents a disorganized 
thought that follows no direction or have no 
consistent meaning. In other words, when noise is 
higher, the association of ideas becomes more 
flexible and the creative thought degenerates to 
disorganization. The border between creativity and 
disorganization is obviously not clear as seen in the 
results reviewed at the beginning of this paper. As a 
consequence, the level of dopaminergic modulation 
of the signal-to-noise ratio that split the geniality 
from the illness can not be determined. Actually, the 
model has shown up to now that there is a 
continuum ranging from the normal thought to the 
disorganized one, passing through what we call 
creativity. In the next simulation, this continuum 
will be shown to encompass even the delusional 
thought. 
As dopamine regulates the signal-to-noise 
ratio, it is necessary for realistic simulations to 
calibrate these two important variables, signal and 
noise, to generate values for this ratio that are 
significant to our experiments. In the previous 
simulations, the noise was gradually increased 
promoting the association between a central idea 
and more and more distant concepts. In the next and 
last experiment, the noise will be kept constant at a 
value p of 5 % and the signal level will be increased 
from 0.999 to 0.9995. The same ten stimuli were 
presented to the neural network and the central idea 
, *, had its signal level increased. The Domain layer 
and the neurons excited at the Image sheet are 
shown in Figure V. Note that, in comparison with 
the original map described in Figure I, the area 
occupied by the ideas has shrunk. This shrinking 
process make the representation more focused and 
the associations between the ideas represented more 
unlike to occur.  The stimulation of the neural 
network with an stimulus representing an idea 
(thesis) probably will not elicit the concomitant 
excitation of  neighboring ideas (antitheses) because 
the shrinking process has separated the regions from 
one another. In this situation, the synthesis becomes 
equal to the thesis because there are no antitheses to 
corroborate or refute the central idea (thesis). The 
normal thought process of weighting many ideas 
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with different influences to achieve a conclusion 
does not happen any more. It is possible to liken this 
phenomenon with the delusional thinking because 
the absence of antitheses does not allow the 
embedding of doubts, resulting in the character of 
unquestionable certainty and incorrigibility of 
delusions. This last simulation shows that the model 
unifies the many-faced phenomenon of normal and 
abnormal thinking. Different thinking processes are 
viewed just as possible positions over a one-
dimensional continuum where the signal-to-noise 
ratio is the measure. At one extreme of this line, 
where the signal-to-noise ratio is high, the semantic 
map becomes more focused in the representations of 
ideas, resulting in the delusional thinking. At the 
other end of the linear continuum, where the signal-
to-noise ratio is low, the excessive noise promotes 
unusually associations between ideas resembling the 
disorganized thought. The normal and the creative 
thought  processes are positioned between these two 
ends, depending on the noise level, as can be 
pictorially shown in Figure VI. 
  
VI. Conclusions 
Based on experiments that hint to the dopaminergic 
signal-to-noise modulation of  the CNS neurons, 
and hypothesizing the existence of semantic cortical 
maps that would represent concepts or ideas, a self-
organizing neural network  model was developed to 
unify the different thought processes in a single 
neurocomputational substrate. Simulations were 
performed varying the two principal control 
parameters of the dopaminergic modulation which 
are the signal and the noise levels carried by the 
neurons from the input to the output of the neural 
network. Stimuli representing different ideas or 
concepts were mapped in a self-organized way and 
this map was taken as a reference for the other 
simulations. These simulations were performed 
simply by stimulating the neural network input layer 
with a single stimulus and observing the areas of the 
output layer excited. At each simulation, the signal-
to-noise ratio was varied and different patterns 
emerged at the output layer. Basically, the stimulus 
used in the stimulation of the input layer was 
compared to a trigger of a central idea (or a thesis) 
at the output layer that, depending on the signal-to-
noise ratio, invaded or not the neighboring areas that 
represented other ideas (antitheses).  Assuming that 
the thought process (or synthesis) is the total pattern 
elicited at the output layer of the neural network as 
the result of the weighted influence of every area 
(thesis and antitheses) excited, the model could 
show how the normal and abnormal thinking 
are generated. In addition, it was shown  that the 
borders between the different thought processes 
(normal or abnormal)  are fuzzy because, 
actually, there are no borders, but a continuum. The 
transition from a high signal-to-noise ratio to a low 
one results in a qualitative change of the reasoning 
process, ranging from delusion to disorganization of 
thought, and passing through what we may call the 
normal and the creative thinking. The model 
unifies the qualitative different thinking processes 
into a neurobiologically-based substrate and also 
shows that these processes define a  continuum with 
gray zones where their differentiation is difficult or 
impossible. Although biologically plausible and 
experimentally based, the model is far from 
explaining the complexities of human thinking but, 
at least, it seems to be a good metaphorical and 
unifying view of the many facets of this 
phenomenon usually  studied in separated settings. 
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Figure I - A reference map with ten different 
concepts represented on it. 
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Figure II  -  The central idea   * (thesis) is associated 
with a neighboring idea ✷ (antithesis), leading to 
the formation of a pattern that is the conclusion of 
the thinking process, or the synthesis. 
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Figure III  -  The central idea   *  (thesis) is 
associated with distant ideas  (antithesis), leading to 
the formation of a pattern that can be likened to the 
creative thinking. 
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Figure IV  -  The central idea   *  (thesis) is 
associated with all ideas, leading to the formation of 
a pattern that can be likened to the disorganized 
thought. 
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Figure V - The stimulation of the neural network 
with a higher signal level leads the ideas to shrink 
their original region in the Image layer, hindering 
their association. Without associations, the synthesis 
becomes the thesis and the antitheses are not 
considered or pondered. This map seems to 
represent a rigidity of thought or a delusional 
thinking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VI  The linear unifying continuum of 
thought processes based on the signal-to-noise 
dopaminergic modulation. 
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